Monetary trends suggest that UK economic performance will converge down to a weak Eurozone. A post in June argued that Eurozone monetary trends were too weak to support a sustained recovery. The composite PMI output index peaked in May and fell below 50 in September (flash reading of 48.9), confirming an ongoing “double dip”.

A pick-up in US narrow money momentum is a hopeful signal for 2025 but requires confirmation and does not preclude near-term economic deterioration. The measure of narrow money tracked here (M1A, comprising currency in circulation and demand deposits) rose by 0.8% in August, pushing six-month annualised growth up to 10.5%. The broad M2+ measure (which adds large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds to the official M2 aggregate) also rose solidly in August, by 0.5%, but six-month growth remains subdued and within the recent range, at 3.5% annualised.

Chinese money / credit trends remain weak but could be at a turning point. Six-month rates of change of broad money and total social financing have stabilised above June lows. (Broad money here refers to M2 excluding money holdings of financial institutions, which are volatile and less informative about economic prospects.)

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Monetary considerations argue that the ECB’s latest inflation forecast, like earlier projections, will be undershot. Annual growth of broad money – as measured by non-financial M3 – returned to its pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average of 4.8% in October 2022. Allowing for a typical two-year lead, this suggested that annual CPI inflation would return to about 2% in late 2024.

The “double dip” downturn in global manufacturing continued last month. Global manufacturing PMI new orders fell steeply from a peak in May 2021 to a trough in December 2022 (first dip), with a subsequent recovery ending in May 2024. The second dip was confirmed by a sharp fall to below 50 in July, with the index unchanged in August.

Global six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have moved sideways for a fourth month in July at a weak level by historical standards. The baseline scenario here remains that global economic momentum – proxied by the global manufacturing PMI new orders index – will move down into late 2024, echoing a fall in real money momentum into September last year. Based on more recent monetary data, a subsequent recovery may prove limited, with weakness persisting well into H1 2025.

The assessment here remains that the global economy has entered a “double dip” currently focused on manufacturing but likely to extend to services / labour markets, reigniting worries about a hard landing. Economic weakness is expected to be accompanied by an inflation undershoot into H1 2025. DM flash manufacturing PMI results for August were mixed across countries but on balance weak, suggesting a further small reduction in global manufacturing PMI new orders following a July plunge to below 50 (assuming no change for China and other non-flash countries).

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The most important issue in the global economic outlook is the meaning of Chinese monetary weakness. Six-month rates of change of narrow / broad money, bank lending and total social financing (on both new and old definitions*) reached record lows in June / July.

A sharp fall in the global manufacturing PMI new orders index in July confirms renewed industrial weakness. The companion services survey, however, reported an uptick in the new business component, which is close to its post-GFC average.

A post in June suggested that a recovery in the OECD’s US composite leading indicator was ending. A calculation based on the latest input data confirms a reversal lower. The historical performance of the OECD indicator compares favourably with the Conference Board leading index

Manufacturing PMI results for July support the forecast of a global “double dip” into early 2025.

The global manufacturing PMI new orders index plunged by 1.9 points from June to 48.8, a seven-month low.

Will the Bank of Japan’s latest attempt to exit ZIRP prove any more successful than its previous two efforts, in 2000 and 2006? The monetary backdrop is no more promising. The six-month rate of change of broad money M3 was 0.5% annualised in June compared with 1.3% and -1.1% respectively before the August 2000 and July 2006 rate hikes.

Global six-month real narrow money momentum – a key indicator in the forecasting process followed here – is estimated to have moved sideways for a third month in June, based on monetary data covering 85% of the aggregate. Real money momentum has recovered from a September 2023 low but remains below both its long-run average and the average in the 10 years preceding the GFC, when short-term interest rates were closer to recent levels. The expectation here has been that the fall into the September 2023 low would be reflected in a weakening of global industrial momentum into late 2024.